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1 Use of the ‘Living Instrument’ Metaphor
To describe a legal instrument as a living organism is to employ
a metaphor that is common in many national legal systems, espe-
cially in constitutional law.1 In a case concerning the question of
whether women were ‘qualiﬁed persons’ who could serve as mem-
bers of the Canadian Senate, the Privy Council remarked that the
constitution of Canada should be viewed as ‘a living tree capable of
growth and expansion within its natural limits’.2 While recognising
that women’s exclusion from public oﬃce had a long history, the
Privy Council asserted that this could not justify the practice as it
did ‘not think it right to apply rigidly to Canada of to-day the
decisions and the reasonings therefor which commended themselves,
probably rightly, to those who had to apply the law in diﬀerent
circumstances, in diﬀerent centuries to countries in diﬀerent stages
of development’.3 In the United States, the perhaps most important
battle in constitutional scholarship pitches the ‘living constitution’,
which can evolve and adapt to changes in social conditions through
interpretation,4 against the ‘originalist constitution’, whose meaning
was ﬁxed by its drafters and is immune to changes through judicial
* The authors are grateful to Raﬀael Fasel, Raphael Keller and Lea Raible for their research
assistance.
1 V. C. Jackson, ‘Constitutions as “Living Trees”? Comparative Constitutional Law and
Interpretive Metaphors’, Fordham L. Rev., 75 (2006), 921–960.
2 Edwards v. Attorney-General of Canada [1930] AC 124, at p. 136.
3 Ibid., at pp. 134–135.
4 See, e.g., D. A. Strauss, The Living Constitution (New York, NY: Oxford University Press,
2010); A. Winkler, ‘A Revolution Too Soon: Woman Suﬀragists and the “Living
Constitution”’, N.Y. Univ. L. Rev., 76 (2001), 1456–1526, and H. L. McBain, The Living
Constitution: A Consideration of the Realities and Legends of Our Fundamental Law
(New York, NY: Workers Bureau Education Press, 1927).
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interpretation.5 Similarly, it has been argued that the German
Grundgesetz should be understood as a ‘lebende Verfassung’.6
Given the origin of the ‘living instrument’ metaphor in constitutional
law, it is not surprising that, in international law, it has been used with
regard to, ﬁrst of all, those treaties that A. D. McNair characterised as
‘treaties creating constitutional international law’, particularly constitu-
ent treaties of international organizations.7 The prime example of
a constitutional treaty commonly described as a ‘living instrument’ is
the 1945 Charter of the United Nations,8 dealt with in Section 2 of this
chapter; another one is theMarrakesh Agreement Establishing theWorld
Trade Organization (WTO).9
However, the ‘living instrument’ metaphor is not conﬁned to trea-
ties constitutive of international organizations but has been used with
regard to a range of further ‘law-making treaties’10 in many areas of
international law, such as international environmental law and inter-
national humanitarian law. Treaties as diverse as the Treaty of
Waitangi of 1840,11 the Treaty on the Construction and Operation of
the Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Barrage System of 197712 and the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS) of 199413 have been explicitly described as ‘living instru-
ments’. The most important category of ‘law-making treaties’ that are
5 See, e.g., A. Scalia, ‘Originalism: The Lesser Evil’, Univ. Cincinnati L. Rev., 57 (1989),
849–865.
6 W. Heun, Die Verfassungsordnung der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Tübingen: Mohr
Siebeck, 2012), p. 26.
7 A. D. McNair, ‘The Functions and Diﬀering Legal Character of Treaties’, BYbIL, 11
(1930), 100–118, at 112.
8 1 UNTS 16.
9 1867 UNTS 154. See the contribution to this volume of Pauwelyn and Van Damme at pp.
809–847 (Chapter 25). See, also, M. E. Footer, ‘The WTO as a “Living Instrument”:
The Contribution of Consensus Decision-Making and Informality to Institutional Norms
and Practices’ in T. Cottier and M. Elsig (eds.), Governing the World Trade Organization:
Past, Present and Beyond Doha (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), pp.
217–240.
10 On the diﬀerent categories of treaties, see the contribution to this volume of Brölmann at
pp. 79–102 (Chapter 4).
11 New Zealand Maori Council and Latimer v. Attorney-General and Others [1987] 1 NZLR
641, at p. 663.
12 Reproduced in ILM, 32 (1993), 1247–1258. See Case Concerning Gabčikovo-Nagymaros
Project (Hungary/Slovakia) (1997) ICJ Rep. 7, at pp. 114–115 (Separate Opinion of Vice-
President Weeramantry).
13 1869 UNTS 299. See ‘Commission Report Is Food for Thought on Intellectual Property –
Supachai’, WTO News, 17 Sept. 2002.
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frequently characterised as ‘living instruments’ is, however, human
rights treaties.14 They are considered in detail in Section 3. It will be
seen in the course of this analysis that the term ‘living instrument’ is no
longer simply a straightforward metaphor deployed to show that
treaties might grow but has become, itself, an evolving concept in the
law of treaties. While the metaphor could be developed to the extent of
identifying the ‘signs of life’ that make a treaty a ‘living instrument’,
the concept of ‘living instrument’ is of greater signiﬁcance because it
embodies a legal understanding of a treaty in terms of its characterisa-
tion, interpretation and evolution.
Aside from constitutional and law-making treaties, the remaining bulk
of treaties, including all ‘contractual treaties’, have not typically been
described as ‘living instruments’. The chapter aims to explore whether
the ‘living instrument’ concept could usefully be applied to some of these
treaties as well, making it of broad appeal. Section 4 therefore considers
arms control law, an area of treaty provision that, at ﬁrst sight, might
appear to be the very antithesis of the ‘living instrument’ notion. While
human rights treaties can be depicted as ‘living instruments’ in
a conceptual sense, in arms control law the metaphor is not even
deployed. However, the chapter will show that it may be appropriate to
also think of arms control treaties in terms of the ‘living instrument’
metaphor.
While it is tempting to draw together all practice across treaties where
the ‘living instrument’ characterisation has been used, this chapter
focuses on treaties within the two areas of human rights law and arms
control law in order to explore the understandings of ‘living instrument’
in greater depth. However, the chapter starts with a brief excursion into
what is often viewed as the paradigmatic ‘living instrument’ – the 1945
Charter of the United Nations.
2 United Nations Charter
Constituent treaties of international organizations, which establish an
organization and lay down rules, are the paradigmatic example of ‘living
instruments’. They adapt to changing social conditions, not automati-
cally but through the ciphers of purposive interpretation by the organs of
the organization. In the case of the United Nations, these consist mainly
of States (in the Security Council, the General Assembly and the
14 See the contribution to this volume of Chinkin at pp. 509–537 (Chapter 16).
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Economic and Social Council) but also of individuals (the Secretariat
headed by the Secretary-General), including judges (in the International
Court of Justice).
Thus the United Nations Charter,15 already as originally agreed in
1945 and before it was developed further, was a move away from the
formalist position of the nineteenth century of the text being the sole
source of information about the rights and duties of States. The Charter
does contain statements on rights and duties of member States, for
example in Article 2, but it also contains statements about the powers
and responsibilities of the organs of the United Nations (for example in
Chapters VI and VII in relation to the Security Council). Indeed, it was
clear in 1945 that the political organs could add to the rights and duties of
States by means of resolutions, interpreting wide phrases such as ‘threat
to the peace’ (in Article 39) and ‘measures not involving the use of armed
force’ (in Article 41). Thus, the Security Council can impose binding
obligations on States in relation to matters of peace and security (Article
25) and the General Assembly in relation to matters of ﬁnancing
(Article 17).
It is clear that the development of the Charter as a ‘living instrument’
has pushed to the limit the rules on interpretation of treaties in Articles
31–33 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).16
Those provisions supplement the textual approach with context (includ-
ing subsequent agreement and practice) and purposes. In reality what
this means is that while the text is the starting point, the changing
understanding of that text is primarily driven by the practice not of all
the member States but of majorities in political organs or by individuals
working for the Secretariat (for instance, in interpreting the Charter’s
provisions on privileges and immunities)17 or by the International Court
of Justice (for instance, in interpreting the Charter to include the capacity
to bring claims against States or the power of both the General Assembly
and the Security Council to create peacekeeping forces).18
Edvard Hambro (writing as Pollux) recognised this as early as in 1946:
15 1 UNTS 16. 16 1155 UNTS 331.
17 For instance, when negotiating a Status of Force Agreement (SOFA) with a host State.
The model SOFA contains a number of clauses on privileges and immunities, though
these may be modiﬁed for a particular operation: see U.N. Doc. A/45/594 (1990).
18 Reparation for Injuries Suﬀered in the Service of the United Nations (Advisory Opinion)
(1949) ICJ Rep. 174 and Certain Expenses of the United Nations (Article 17, Paragraph 2 of
the Charter) (Advisory Opinion) (1962) ICJ Rep. 151.
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The Charter, like every written Constitution, will be a living instrument.
It will be applied daily; and every application of the Charter, every use of
an Article, implies an interpretation; on each occasion a decision is
involved whichmay change the existing law and start a new constitutional
development. A constitutional customary law will grow up and the
Charter itself will merely form the framework of the Organization
which will be ﬁlled in by the practice of the diﬀerent organs.19
Christian Tomuschat supports this depiction by describing the United
Nations as an ‘entire system which is in constant movement, not unlike
a national constitution whose original texture will be unavoidably mod-
iﬁed by thick layers of political practice and jurisprudence’.20 Rosalyn
Higgins states further that ‘the Charter is an extraordinary instrument,
and a huge variety of possibilities are possible under it’.21
Subsequent practice is therefore a signiﬁcant means of interpreting
and developing the Charter. Nevertheless, sole reliance on practice as the
test for legality is not acceptable,22 since practice must be accompanied by
normative intent andmust be constrained by the purposes and principles
of the Charter, which are broad but not unlimited. As stated by the
International Court of Justice in the Certain Expenses advisory opinion
in 1962, the purposes of the United Nations ‘are broad indeed, but
neither they nor the powers conferred to eﬀectuate them are
unlimited’.23 It further held that ‘when the Organization takes action
which warrants the assertion that it was appropriate for the fulﬁlment of
one of the stated purposes of the United Nations, the presumption is that
such action is not ultra vires the Organization’.24
As well as the purposes, the text of the Charter will also provide
limitations on its evolution. Perhaps the most important explicit limita-
tion derives from Article 2(7) regarding intervention in the domestic
aﬀairs of States, but even the eﬀect of this limitation has been restricted
by a dynamic interpretation of what is domestic.25 The amount of
practice required to give a text a radically diﬀerent meaning would
19 Pollux, ‘The Interpretation of the Charter’, BYbIL, 23 (1946), 54–82.
20 C. Tomuschat, ‘Obligations Arising for States without or against Their Will’, Hague
Recueil, 241 (1993–IV), 195–374, at 251–252.
21 R. Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1994), p. 184.
22 S. Rosenne, Developments in the Law of Treaties 1945–1986 (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1989), p. 244.
23 Certain Expenses of the United Nations, supra n. 18, at p. 168. 24 Ibid.
25 N. D. White, Law of International Organisations (Manchester: Manchester University
Press, 2nd ed., 2005), pp. 89–98.
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have to be signiﬁcant in terms of volume and support, amounting to
virtual agreement amongst the whole membership.26 Nevertheless, any
number of examples could be given for this, from the principles con-
tained in Article 2, to the understanding of the General Assembly’s
powers under Chapter IV (to mandate peacekeeping forces, for
instance), to those of the Security Council under Chapter VII (to
massively expand the concept of threat to the peace in Article 39, to
create ad hoc criminal tribunals, post-conﬂict administrations and
legislation on terrorism and weapons of mass destruction under
Article 41, to develop a military option that is not based on special
agreement under Article 43 or a Military Staﬀ Committee under Article
47), and to those of the Secretary General under Articles 97–99 (where
he has long ceased to be simply the Chief Administrative Oﬃcer of the
organization but has become the embodiment of diplomacy and initia-
tive within the UN system).27
A simple example can be given where an interpretation by practice
within the Security Council has been accepted by the wider membership
and the International Court of Justice, and this relates to the under-
standing of the veto and when it operates under Article 27(3) of the
Charter. In its Namibia advisory opinion of 1971, the International
Court of Justice considered South African objections to the validity of
the Security Council resolution which requested the opinion of the
Court on the legality of the continued presence of South Africa in
Namibia. Two permanent members had abstained on the resolution
which, according to South Africa, therefore did not comply with the
stipulations of Article 27(3) of the Charter that such decisions ‘shall be
made by an aﬃrmative vote of nine members including the concurring
votes of the permanent members’. After the Court had examined the
proceedings of the Security Council, extending over a long period of
time, it concluded that the ‘practice of voluntary abstention by
a permanent member’ did not prevent the adoption of a valid resolu-
tion, so that only a negative vote by a permanent member constituted
a veto preventing the adoption of a resolution. Although primarily
relying on the practice of the Security Council, the Court also noted
that there was support for this interpretation among the wider
26 C. F. Amerasinghe, Principles of the Institutional Law of International Organizations
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2nd ed., 2005), pp. 49–61.
27 B. E. Urquhart, ‘The Evolution of the Secretary-General’ in S. Chesterman (ed.), Secretary
or General?: The UN Secretary-General in World Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2007), pp. 15–32.
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membership of the United Nations.28 Although the practice did not
produce an understanding that was contrary to the textual meaning (in
particular the power of veto was not diminished by this practice), it did
move the text a considerable way from its (admittedly rather ambig-
uous) literal meaning, and it also served the purposes of the United
Nations by allowing its executive organ to take action in a greater
number of situations than would have been possible had abstentions
been treated as vetoes.29
Furthermore, despite some equivocation by the International Court in
the Namibia opinion, within the UN system it is not the practice of
member States that breathes life into the Charter but rather it is the
practice of the organs.30 This was recognised in an earlier opinion of the
International Court of Justice on the practice of dealing with applications
for membership in the political organs of the United Nations, when it
stated that ‘[t]he organs to which Article 4 entrusts the judgment of the
Organization in matters of admission have consistently interpreted the
text . . .’.31 However, in an earlier opinion of 1948 on membership, the
Court had made it absolutely clear that such decisions still had to be
exercised within the conﬁnes of the Charter:
The political character of an organ cannot release it from the observance
of the treaty provisions established by the Charter when they constitute
limitations on its powers or criteria for its judgment.32
Thus, from an early stage, it was recognised that the Charter was a ‘living’
constitution that both allowed for freedom to develop its open-ended
provisions but still provided limitations to prevent unrestricted growth.
The growth has been provided primarily by the political organs of the
United Nations in developing the broad purposes and powers given to
them by the Charter, although the International Court of Justice has also
made some signiﬁcant contributions. In contrast, in the case of human
28 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South
West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) (Advisory Opinion)
(1971) ICJ Rep. 16, at p. 22.
29 See, further, A. Zimmermann, ‘Article 27’ in B. Simma, D.-E. Khan, G. Nolte and
A. Paulus (eds.), The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary (Vol. I) (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 3rd ed., 2012), pp. 871–938, at pp. 912–916.
30 B. Fassbender, ‘The United Nations Charter as Constitution of the International
Community’, Columbia JTL, 36 (1998), 529–619.
31 Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to the United Nations
(Advisory Opinion) (1950) ICJ Rep. 4, at p. 9 (emphasis added).
32 Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations (Article 4 of the
Charter) (Advisory Opinion) (1948) ICJ Rep. 57, at p. 64.
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rights treaties, it has been (quasi-)judicial organs created by these
treaties that have breathed life into their provisions by interpreting
them by reference to changing social mores and changing norms of
international law.
3 Human Rights Treaties
A category of ‘law-making treaties’ that have been characterised as
‘living instruments’ from early on is human rights treaties. Judge
Álvarez of the International Court of Justice thought already in 1951
that the 1948 United Nations Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide33 belonged to a category of
‘multilateral conventions of a special character’,34 which ‘must be inter-
preted without regard to the past, and only with regard to the future’.35
According to him, such conventions are distinct from the preparatory
work which preceded them: they ‘have acquired a life of their own; they
can be compared to ships which leave the yards in which they have been
built, and sail away independently, no longer attached to the
dockyard’.36
However, it was the European Court of Human Rights that gave
real substance to the notion of an evolutive interpretation of human
rights treaties and developed the idea that such treaties should be
understood as ‘living instruments’. The Court characterised the 1950
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)37 as a ‘living
instrument’ for the ﬁrst time in 1978, and this notion has now
become one of the central features of its approach to the interpreta-
tion of the Convention.38 Although it took two more decades until
the bodies supervising implementation of other human rights treaties
started to take up the ‘living instrument’ idea, by today the ‘living
instrument’ label tends to be attached to the category of human
rights treaties as a whole.
33 78 UNTS 277.
34 Reservations to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Advisory Opinion) (1951) ICJ Rep. 15, at p. 51 (Dissenting Opinion of Judge
Álvarez).
35 Ibid., at p. 53. 36 Ibid. 37 213 UNTS 222.
38 See, further, G. Letsas, ‘The ECHR as a Living Instrument: Its Meaning and Legitimacy’ in
A. Føllesdal, B. Peters and G. Ulfstein (eds.), Constituting Europe: The European Court of
Human Rights in a National, European and Global Context (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2013), pp. 106–141.
treaties as ‘living instruments ’ 143
Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316179031.008
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zürich, on 07 Dec 2018 at 20:13:02, subject to the
3.1 ECHR
The ﬁrst mention of ‘living instrument’ in Strasbourg’s case law can be
found in the judgment of Tyrer v. United Kingdom, handed down in
1978.39 Anthony Tyrer was ﬁfteen years old when a juvenile court
sentenced him to three strokes of the birch in accordance with the
legislation then in force on the Isle of Man. He was taken to a police
station where he had to take down his trousers and underpants and bend
over a table. He was held by two police oﬃcers whilst a third executed the
punishment.40 The European Court had to decide whether such judi-
cially imposed corporal punishment amounted to ‘degrading punish-
ment’ in breach of Article 3 ECHR. The Attorney-General for the Isle
of Man argued that it did not, ‘since it did not outrage public opinion in
the Island’.41 The Court rejected this argument, pointing out that the
reason why the inhabitants of the island support corporal punishment
may be precisely that they believe it to be degrading and thus an eﬀective
deterrent. In a passage that has since become one of the Court’s standard
formulations (at least its ﬁrst part), it then went on to state:
The Court must also recall that the Convention is a living instrument
which, as the Commission rightly stressed, must be interpreted in the light
of present-day conditions. In the case now before it the Court cannot but
be inﬂuenced by the developments and commonly accepted standards in
the penal policy of the member States of the Council of Europe in this
ﬁeld.42
The background andmeaning of this passage are rather mysterious. In its
decision in Tyrer, the European Commission of Human Rights had, in
fact, neither described the Convention as a ‘living instrument’ nor
referred to ‘present-day conditions’. In addition, despite its insistence
on this point, the Court did not explain what ‘the developments and
commonly accepted standards in the penal policy’ of European States
were. While it remarked rather incidentally – in a passage not relating to
Article 3 ECHR – that corporal punishment was not used ‘in the great
majority of the member States of the Council of Europe’,43 there is no
review of the legislation or legal developments in these States. Even more
problematically, the Court did not give any reasons for its characterisa-
tion of the ECHR as a ‘living instrument’, which has now become one of
its most important interpretive approaches: it did not explain why and
39 Tyrer v. United Kingdom, No. 5856/72, Judgment of 25 Apr. 1978, Series A, No. 26.
40 Ibid. (paragraphs 9–10). 41 Ibid. (paragraph 31). 42 Ibid.
43 Ibid. (paragraph 38).
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how much it matters that there are ‘commonly accepted standards’ and
why the ECHR should be interpreted in the light of them.44 In fact, it is
clear from the Court’s reasoning that the decisive factor for reaching its
decision that Article 3 had been violated was not the development of
common European standards at all. Instead, it was ‘[t]he very nature of
judicial corporal punishment’ that made it degrading, since ‘it involves
one human being inﬂicting physical violence on another human being’.45
A year later, in Marckx v. Belgium, the Court, although not explicitly
describing the ECHR as a ‘living instrument’, referred to its judgment in
Tyrer and repeated that the Convention ‘must be interpreted in the light
of present-day conditions’.46 Accordingly, the Court attached no weight
to the fact that ‘at the time when the Convention of 4 November 1950 was
drafted, it was regarded as permissible and normal in many European
countries to draw a distinction in this area between the “illegitimate” and
the “legitimate” family’.47 In the meantime, the Court pointed out, the
domestic law of the great majority of the Council of Europe member
States had evolved and continued to evolve towards full recognition of
maternal aﬃliation by birth alone with respect to ‘illegitimate children’.
While the Court admitted that two conventions aiming at establishing
equality between ‘legitimate’ and ‘illegitimate’ children had only been
ratiﬁed by a small number of members States, it thought it suﬃcient that
there were signs of an ‘evolution of rules and attitudes’ ‘amongst modern
societies’.48
One of the Court’s most famous invocations of the ‘living instrument’
notion was that in Selmouni v. France where it made it clear that what
qualiﬁes as ‘torture’ within the meaning of Article 3 ECHR may well
change over the years:
[H]aving regard to the fact that the Convention is a ‘living instrument
which must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions’ . . . the
Court considers that certain acts which were classiﬁed in the past as
‘inhuman and degrading treatment’ as opposed to ‘torture’ could be
classiﬁed diﬀerently in future. It takes the view that the increasingly
high standard being required in the area of the protection of human rights
and fundamental liberties correspondingly and inevitably requires greater
44 See, also, A. Mowbray, ‘The Creativity of the European Court of Human Rights’,HRLR, 5
(2005), 57–79, at 61.
45 Tyrer v. United Kingdom, supra n. 39 (paragraph 33).
46 Marckx v. Belgium, No. 6833/74, Judgment of 13 June 1979, Series A, No. 31 (para-
graph 41).
47 Ibid. 48 Ibid.
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ﬁrmness in assessing breaches of the fundamental values of democratic
societies.49
Accordingly, the Court found the kind of ill-treatment that had occurred
in this case to amount to torture, even though on application of the
standards established in its previous case law it probably would have had
to be classiﬁed as inhuman treatment.50 This ﬁnding is a good illustration
of the Court’s use of the ‘living instrument’ notion insofar as it is typically
invoked to support an extension of the Convention’s protective scope.
By the time of writing, the ECHR has been described as a ‘living
instrument’ in ninety-one judgments and decisions (ﬁfty-ﬁve times the
term appears in the majority’s judgment/decision, twenty-six times in
a separate opinion, ten times in both). The equivalent French term
‘instrument vivant’ was used in a further twenty-three judgements and
decisions (twelve times in the majority’s judgment/decision, eleven times
in a separate opinion). In addition, not counting the judgments and
decisions containing an explicit reference to ‘living instrument’ just
referred to, the Court (or one of its members) has stated that the
Convention must be interpreted in the light of ‘present-day conditions’
an additional thirty-six times (twenty-four judgments/decisions, twelve
separate opinions), while the equivalent reference to ‘conditions de vie
actuelles’ appears in two separate opinions. In total, therefore, the ‘living
instrument’ idea has been invoked in 152 judgments and decisions.
The Court has used the ‘living instrument’ notion, for example, to
characterise the death penalty as inhuman and degrading treatment in
the sense of Article 3,51 to qualify human traﬃcking as falling within the
prohibition of slavery and forced labour of Article 4,52 to limit the role of
the executive branch in deciding on the release of prisoners under Article
5,53 to read a right not to be compelled to join an association into Article
1154 and to qualify the rejection of a lesbian woman’s application to adopt
a child as discriminatory and thus in violation of Article 14.55
49 Selmouni v. France, No. 25803/94, Judgment of 28 July 1999, Reports 1999-V (para-
graph 101).
50 See Ireland v. United Kingdom, No. 5310/71, Judgment of 18 Jan. 1978, Series A, No. 25
(paragraph 167).
51 Al-Saadoon and Mufdhi v. United Kingdom, No. 61498/08, Judgment of 2 March 2010,
Reports 2010 (paragraphs 119–120).
52 Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, No. 25965/04, Judgment of 7 Jan. 2010, Reports 2010.
53 Staﬀord v. United Kingdom, No. 46295/99, Judgment of 28 May 2002, Reports 2002-IV.
54 Sigurdur A. Sigurjónsson v. Iceland, No. 16130/90, Judgment of 30 June 1993, Series A,
No. 264.
55 E.B. v. France [GC], No. 43546/02, Judgment of 22 Jan. 2008.
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The Court has relied on the ‘living instrument’ approach to interpret
not only the substantive but also the procedural guarantees of the ECHR,
such as those concerning interim measures56 and the territorial jurisdic-
tion of the Court.57 In Loizidou v. Turkey (Preliminary Objections), it
explained that, just as the substantive guarantees, the procedural provi-
sions ‘cannot be interpreted solely in accordance with the intentions of
their authors as expressed more than forty years ago’.58
The ‘present-day conditions’ that may inﬂuence the Court’s interpre-
tation of the Convention may consist of legal developments within the
respondent State such as legislative reforms or changes in the case law of
the domestic courts.59 More often, however, the Court refers, as in Tyrer
andMarckx, to the situation in other member States or sometimes, as in
Christine Goodwin v. United Kingdom,60 even to that in non-member
States. In the latter case, the Court explicitly recognised that there was no
‘common European approach’ regarding the legal recognition of the new
sexual identity of post-operative transsexuals but, based on a review of
the legal situation in a number of non-European States, attached more
importance to ‘the clear and uncontested evidence of a continuing inter-
national trend’ than to the lack of a common European standard.61
In recent years, the Court has also given increased weight to develop-
ments in international law.62 In Demir and Baykara v. Turkey it
expanded the ‘living instrument’ formula accordingly:
[T]he Convention is a living instrument which must be interpreted in the
light of present-day conditions, and in accordance with developments in
international law, so as to reﬂect the increasingly high standard being
required in the area of the protection of human rights, thus necessitating
greater ﬁrmness in assessing breaches of the fundamental values of demo-
cratic societies.63
56 Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, Nos. 46827/99 and 46951/99, Judgment of 4 Feb.
2005, Reports 2005-I.
57 Loizidou v. Turkey (Preliminary Objections), No. 15318/89, Judgment of 23 March 1995,
Series A, No. 310.
58 Ibid. (paragraph 71). 59 Staﬀord v. United Kingdom, supra n. 53 (paragraphs 69–80).
60 Christine Goodwin v. United Kingdom, No. 28957/95, Judgment of 11 July 2002, Reports
2002-VI.
61 Ibid. (paragraphs 56 and 84–85).
62 See, already, Golder v. United Kingdom, No. 4451/70, Judgment of 21 Feb. 1975, Series A,
No. 18 (paragraph 29) and Loizidou v. Turkey (Merits), No. 15318/89, Judgment of 18
Dec. 1996, Reports 1996-VI (paragraph 43).
63 Demir and Baykara v. Turkey [GC], No. 34503/97, Judgment of 12 Nov. 2008, Reports
2008 (paragraph 146) (emphasis added).
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In this case, concerning the right of civil servants to form trade unions,
the Court referred very extensively to various international instruments,
including ILOConventions and the European Social Charter, to interpret
Article 11 ECHR. The Turkish government objected that it had not
ratiﬁed the respective provisions of the European Social Charter and
that the Court was not entitled to create, by way of interpretation, new
obligations not provided for in the ECHR. The Court stated that it had
‘never considered the provisions of the Convention as the sole framework
of reference for the interpretation of the rights and freedoms enshrined
therein’ but had also ‘taken account of evolving norms of national and
international law’,64 which ‘show, in a precise area, that there is common
ground in modern societies’.65 Thus, it was ‘not necessary for the respon-
dent State to have ratiﬁed the entire collection of instruments that are
applicable in respect of the precise subject matter of the case
concerned’.66 Similarly, in Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia the Court drew
upon the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Traﬃcking in
Persons, especially Women and Children and the Council of Europe
Convention on Action against Traﬃcking in Human Beings to support
its conclusion that traﬃcking in human beings falls within the scope of
Article 4 ECHR, even though these instruments had not yet been in force
at the relevant time.67
However, the Court has also made it clear that there are limits as to
what the ‘living instrument’method can achieve. In Johnston v. Ireland, it
had to decide whether a right to divorce could be derived from Article 12
ECHR, guaranteeing the right to marry.68 The Court recognised ‘that the
Convention and its Protocols must be interpreted in the light of present-
day conditions’ but held that it ‘cannot, by means of an evolutive inter-
pretation, derive from these instruments a right that was not included
therein at the outset’, particularly where the omission was deliberate.69
The ‘living instrument’ approach may also reach its limits where it
conﬂicts with a systematic interpretation of the ECHR. In Pretty v. United
Kingdom, the applicant, who suﬀered from a terrible, irreversible disease
in its ﬁnal stages, argued that Article 3 ECHR imposed a positive obliga-
tion on the State to sanction the assisted suicide of a terminally ill
person.70 The Court held otherwise, stating that while it ‘must take
64 Ibid. (paragraphs 67–68). 65 Ibid. (paragraph 86). 66 Ibid.
67 Rantsev v. Cyprus and Russia, supra n. 52 (paragraph 282).
68 Johnston v. Ireland, No. 9697/82, Judgment of 18 Dec. 1986, Series A, No. 112.
69 Ibid. (paragraph 53).
70 Pretty v. United Kingdom, No. 2346/02, Judgment of 29 Apr. 2002, Reports 2002-III.
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a dynamic and ﬂexible approach to the interpretation of the Convention,
which is a living instrument, any interpretationmust also accord with the
fundamental objectives of the Convention and its coherence as a system
of human rights protection’. Therefore, Article 3 ECHR had to be con-
strued in harmony with Article 2 ECHR, the right to life.71
Finally, the Court will be reluctant to rely on the ‘living instrument’
method where the member States have taken it upon themselves to
further develop and deﬁne the ECHR standards. Soering v. United
Kingdom raised the question of whether imposition of the death penalty
would amount to a violation of Article 3 ECHR.72 While reaﬃrming that
the Convention is a ‘living instrument’, the Court pointed out that
Protocol No. 6 to the ECHR concerning the Abolition of the Death
Penalty of 1983 showed that the intention of the State parties was to
adopt the normal method of amendment of the text through
a subsequent written and, in addition, optional instrument. Therefore,
notwithstanding the special character of the Convention, Article 3 could
not be interpreted as generally prohibiting the death penalty.73
As the Court has recently summarised its case law, the ‘living instru-
ment’ approach ‘does not . . . mean that to respond to present-day
needs, conditions, views or standards the Court can create a new right
apart from those recognised by the Convention . . . or that it can whittle
down an existing right or create a new “exception” or “justiﬁcation”
which is not expressly recognised in the Convention’.74 What qualiﬁes
as a ‘new’ right or exception is, however, a question of interpretation.
Thus, some authors75 have argued that the Court has, in fact, engaged in
the creation of a new right that had been deliberately omitted from the
Convention, when it held that the guarantee of freedom of association
of Article 11 includes a ‘negative right’ not to be compelled to join an
association.76
71 Ibid. (paragraph 54).
72 Soering v. United Kingdom, No. 14038/88, Judgment of 7 July 1989, Series A, No. 161.
73 Ibid. (paragraph 103).
74 Austin and Others v. United Kingdom, Nos. 39692/09, 40713/09 and 41008/09, Judgment
of 15 March 2012, Reports 2012 (paragraph 53).
75 G. Letsas, A Theory of Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), p. 65, and Baroness Hale of Richmond,
‘Beanstalk or Living Instrument? How Tall Can the ECHR Grow?’, Barnard’s Inn
Reading 2011 (www.supremecourt.gov.uk/docs/speech_110616.pdf).
76 Young, James andWebster v. United Kingdom, Nos. 7601/76 and 7806/77, Judgment of 13
Aug. 1981, Series A, No. 44 (paragraph 53) and Sigurdur A. Sigurjónsson v. Iceland,
supra n. 54.
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3.2 Inter-American Instruments
The ‘living instrument’ method developed by the European Court of
Human Rights has clearly inﬂuenced the interpretive approach of the
Inter-American human rights bodies. Nevertheless, when the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, in 1989, for the ﬁrst time empha-
sised the need for an evolutive interpretation of human rights instru-
ments, this was backed up by a reference not to the European Court’s
case law but to the Namibia opinion of the International Court of
Justice, according to which ‘an international instrument must be inter-
preted and applied within the overall framework of the juridical system
in force at the time of the interpretation’.77 Therefore, the Inter-
American Court thought that, to determine the legal status of the
American Declaration of Human Rights,78 it had to ‘look to the inter-
American system of today in the light of the evolution it has undergone
since the adoption of the Declaration, rather than to examine the
normative value and signiﬁcance which that instrument was believed
to have had in 1948’.79
In 1999, however, the Court did cite the European Court’s judg-
ments in Tyrer, Marckx and Loizidou to support its observation that
‘human rights treaties are living instruments whose interpretation
must consider the changes over time and present-day conditions’.80
The Court held that such an evolutive interpretation is consistent with
the general rules of treaty interpretation established in the VCLT and
that international human rights law ‘has made great headway thanks to
an evolutive interpretation of international instruments of
protection’.81 Since then, the Inter-American Court has repeatedly
made the following – or some similar – observation, mainly having
in mind the 1969 American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR)82
77 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South
West Africa), supra n. 28, at p. 31.
78 Adopted by the Ninth International Conference of American States (1948), reprinted in
Basic Documents Pertaining to Human Rights in the Inter-American System, OEA/Ser.L.
V/II.82 Doc.6 Rev.1 at 17 (1992).
79 OC-10/89, Interpretation of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man
within the Framework of Article 64 of the American Convention on Human Rights,
IACtHR Advisory Opinion of 14 July 1989, Series A, No. 10 (paragraph 37).
80 OC-16/99, The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of
Guarantees for Due Legal Process, IACtHR Advisory Opinion of 1 Oct. 1999, Series
A, No. 16 (paragraph 114). See, also, ibid. (paragraphs 7 and 10–11) (Concurring
Opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade).
81 Ibid. (paragraph 114). 82 1144 UNTS 123.
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but also, in one case,83 the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child
(CRC):84 ‘The Court has pointed out, as the European Court of
Human Rights has too, that human rights treaties are live instruments,
whose interpretation must go hand in hand with evolving times and
current living conditions’.85
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, for its part,
referred to the ‘living instrument’ concept for the ﬁrst time in 2000.
In a case concerning the mandatory imposition of the death penalty for
certain oﬀences, the petitioners had argued that, just as the ECHR, ‘the
American Convention is a living, breathing and developing instrument
reﬂecting contemporary standards of morality, justice and decency’.86
The Commission, referring in a footnote to the European Court’s ‘living
instrument’ approach and citing Tyrer, held that ‘a principle of law has
developed common to those democratic jurisdictions that have retained
the death penalty, according to which the death penalty should only be
implemented through “individualized” sentencing’.87 Exactly the same
formulation and footnote can be found in a number of similar cases
decided on the same day88 and in 2001.89 In 2002, the Commission,
asserting that it was ‘well-accepted’ that ‘human rights treaties are living
instruments whose interpretation must consider changes over time and
present-day conditions’, held that the prohibition of executing persons
below the age of eighteen had evolved into a norm of jus cogens.90 As the
83 ‘Street Children’ (Villagrán Morales et al.) v. Guatemala, IACtHR Judgment of 19 Nov.
1999, Series C, No. 63 (paragraph 193).
84 1577 UNTS 3.
85 Mapiripan Massacre v. Colombia, IACtHR Judgment of 15 Sept. 2005, Series C, No. 35
(paragraph 106). See, also, Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, IACtHR
Judgment of 17 June 2005, Series C, No. 125 (paragraph 125); Mayagna (Sumo) Awas
Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, IACtHR Judgment of 31 Aug. 2001, Series C, No. 66
(paragraph 146) and ‘Street Children’ (Villagrán Morales et al.) v. Guatemala, supra n. 83
(paragraph 193).
86 Case 11.743, Baptiste v. Grenada, IACoHR Report 38/00 of 13 Apr. 2000, Annual Report
2000 (paragraph 31).
87 Ibid. (paragraph 95 and fn. 59).
88 Cases 12.023 and Others, McKenzie et al. v. Jamaica, IACoHR Report 41/00 of 13 Apr.
2000, Annual Report 2000 (paragraph 209 and fn. 87).
89 Cases 11.826 and Others, Lamey et al. v. Jamaica, IACoHR Report 49/01 of 4 Apr. 2001,
Annual Report 2001 (paragraphs 140–141 and fn. 52); Case 12.028, Knights v. Grenada,
IACoHR Report 47/01 of 4 Apr. 2001, Annual Report 2001 (paragraph 87 and fn. 58) and
Cases 12.067 and Others, Edwards et al. v. Bahamas, IACoHR Report 48/01 of 4 Apr.
2001, Annual Report 2000 (paragraph 152 and fn. 80).
90 Case 12.285, Domingues v. United States, IACoHR Report 62/02 of 22 Oct. 2002, Annual
Report 2002 (paragraph 103 and fn. 104). See, also, ibid. (paragraph 44 and fn. 30)
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European Court has done for the ECHR, the Inter-American
Commission has suggested that the ‘living instrument’ concept is applic-
able with regard not only to substantive guarantees of human rights but
also to the procedural provisions of the ACHR.91
3.3 UN Instruments
Among the bodies supervising implementation of the universal human
rights treaties, the UNHuman Rights Committee was the ﬁrst, in 2002, to
apply the ‘living instrument’ method. In the landmark case of Judge
v. Canada, it had to decide whether Canada violated the author’s right
to life under Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR)92 by deporting him to the United States, where he had
been sentenced to the death penalty.93 Nine years earlier the Committee
had held that the deportation of a person from a country which has
abolished the death penalty to a country where he or she faces capital
punishment does not per se amount to a violation of Article 6.94 In Judge,
the Committee recognised that it ‘should ensure both consistency and
coherence of its jurisprudence’ but noted that in exceptional situations it
may be necessary to review the scope of application of the rights pro-
tected in the ICCPR, ‘in particular if there have been notable factual and
legal developments and changes in international opinion in respect of the
issue raised’.95 The Committee observed that, since its earlier decision,
there had been ‘a broadening international consensus in favour of aboli-
tion of the death penalty, and in States which have retained the death
penalty, a broadening consensus not to carry it out’. The Committee
thought it signiﬁcant that Canada’s own practice reﬂected this consensus:
the Supreme Court of Canada had held that in such cases of removal the
government must, as a general rule, seek assurances that the death
penalty will not be applied. Considering ‘that the Covenant should be
interpreted as a living instrument and the rights protected under it
(referring to the need to interpret the American Declaration in the light of present-day
conditions and citing Tyrer, Marckx and Loizidou).
91 Interstate Case 01/06, Nicaragua v. Costa Rica, IACoHR Report 11/07 of 8 March 2007,
Annual Report 2007 (paragraph 205).
92 999 UNTS 171.
93 Judge v. Canada, Communication No. 829/1998 of 5 Aug. 2002, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/78/
D/829/1998.
94 Kindler v. Canada, CommunicationNo. 470/1991 of 30 July 1993, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/48/
D/470/1991.
95 Judge v. Canada, supra n. 93 (paragraph 10.3).
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should be applied in context and in the light of present-day conditions’,96
the Committee departed from its previous ﬁndings and found a violation
of Article 6.97
The Human Rights Committee has addressed similar interpretive
issues in a series of cases concerning conscientious objection to compul-
sory military service. In Yoon and Choi v. Republic of Korea,98 it deviated
from its previous jurisprudence99 and recognised that Article 18 ICCPR
(guaranteeing freedom of conscience) implies a right to conscientious
objection. To support this change in interpretation it argued that the
understanding of Article 18, as that of any right guaranteed by the
Covenant, evolved over time100 and observed that ‘an increasing number’
of those States parties which had retained compulsory military service
had introduced alternatives to that service.101 In Atasoy and Sarkut
v. Turkey, the State party argued that there were limits to evolutive
interpretation: ‘interpretation cannot go beyond the letter and spirit of
the treaty or what the States parties initially and explicitly so intended’.102
Nevertheless, the Committee reaﬃrmed its view that a right of conscien-
tious objection, even though not explicitly referred to in Article 18,
derives from this provision,103 with one Committee member stressing
in his individual opinion that the Committee ‘must apply and interpret
the Covenant as a living instrument’.104
The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination invoked
the ‘living instrument’ concept in 2003 to support its conclusion that use
of a term that was not considered oﬀensive some time ago may be
considered oﬀensive today and thus violate the 1965 International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(ICERD).105 InHagan v. Australia, the petitioner had taken oﬀence at the
sign ‘E.S. “Nigger” Brown Stand’, which had been displayed since 1960 on
96 Ibid. 97 Ibid. (paragraph 10.6).
98 Yoon and Choi v. Republic of Korea, Communications Nos. 1321/2004 and 1322/2004 of
3 Nov. 2006, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/88/D/1321–1322/2004.
99 See, e.g., L.T.K. v. Finland, Communication No. 185/1984 of 9 July 1985, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/OP/2, (paragraph 5.2.) (‘The Covenant does not provide for the right to
conscientious objection; neither article 18 nor article 19 of the Covenant, especially
taking into account paragraph 3(c)(ii) of [Art.] 8, can be construed as implying that
right’).
100 Yoon and Choi v. Republic of Korea, supra n. 98 (paragraph 8.2).
101 Ibid. (paragraph 8.4).
102 Atasoy and Sarkut v. Turkey, Communications Nos. 1853/2008 and 1854/2008 of
29 March 2012, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/104/D/1853–1854/2008 (paragraph 7.13).
103 Ibid. (paragraph 10.4). 104 Ibid. (paragraph 4) (Individual Opinion Salvioli).
105 660 UNTS 195.
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a stand of a sporting ground in honour of a sporting personality who was
neither black nor of aboriginal descent.106 The Committee held
that use and maintenance of the oﬀending term can at the present time be
considered oﬀensive and insulting, even if for an extended period it may
not have necessarily been so regarded. The Committee considers, in fact,
that the Convention, as a living instrument, must be interpreted and
applied taking into [sic!] the circumstances of contemporary society.
In this context, the Committee considers it to be its duty to recall the
increased sensitivities in respect of words such as the oﬀending term
appertaining today.107
The Committee has since reaﬃrmed in its General Recommendation 32
that ‘[t]he Convention, as the Committee has observed on many occa-
sions, is a living instrument that must be interpreted and applied taking
into account the circumstances of contemporary society’, which made it
imperative to read its text in a context-sensitive manner.108
The Committee on the Rights of the Child has equally invoked the
‘living instrument’ concept in a general comment. In its General
Comment 8 concerning the right of the child to protection from corporal
punishment, it has explained that, while the travaux préparatoires for the
CRC did not record any discussion of corporal punishment during the
drafting sessions, ‘the Convention, like all human rights instruments,
must be regarded as a living instrument, whose interpretation develops
over time’ and that in the seventeen years since the CRCwas adopted, the
prevalence of corporal punishment had become more visible.109
3.4 Assessment
As the preceding review demonstrates, in international human rights law,
the ‘living instrument’ notion is used in a similar way as with regard to
the UN Charter, namely primarily as a metaphor to justify a dynamic or
evolutive interpretation.110 Often it is invoked, as in Marckx, to support
106 Hagan v. Australia, CommunicationNo. 26/2002 of 20March 2003, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/
62/D/26/2002.
107 Ibid. (paragraph 7.3).
108 Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General Recommendation
No. 32 of 24 Sept. 2009, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/GC/32 (paragraph 5).
109 Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 8 of 2 March 2007, U.N.
Doc. CRC/C/GC/8 (paragraph 20).
110 On dynamic or evolutive interpretation, see M. Fitzmaurice, ‘Dynamic (Evolutive)
Interpretation of Treaties: Part I’, Hague YbIL, 21 (2008), 101–153; M. Fitzmaurice,
‘Dynamic (Evolutive) Interpretation of Treaties: Part II’, Hague YbIL, 22 (2009), 3–31,
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an interpretation that arguably deviates from the understanding that the
drafters of the treaty had or, as in Selmouni and Judge, to explain a change
in the case law.
One may question whether the ‘living instrument’ metaphor is
a completely accurate description of this method of interpretation.
The metaphor suggests that, similar to living organisms, legal instru-
ments change their shape by themselves, when it is in fact the
external social conditions that change, and the legal instruments
are adapted to them.
Be that as it may, what is more important is the question as to the
legality and legitimacy of this method of interpretation.When it comes to
human rights treaties, international and regional courts or quasi-judicial
bodies assume to a large extent the interpretive role that is played by
States (or organs composed of States) with regard to other treaties.Where
member States entrust a (quasi-)judicial body with supervising imple-
mentation of the treaty, they thereby also cede to it the interpretive
authority over the treaty. The European Court of Human Rights,111 the
Inter-American Court of Human Rights112 and the international human
rights bodies113 have all accepted that they are bound, to the same extent
as States, to apply the rules of treaty interpretation codiﬁed in Articles 31
and 32 VCLT when interpreting the human rights conventions they are
charged with supervising. In principle, it seems clear that the ‘living
instrument’ method may be covered, and indeed required, by these
rules. Article 31(1) VCLT requires a treaty to be interpreted ‘in accor-
dance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in
their context and in the light of its object and purpose’. According to
Article 31(3)(b) VCLT, ‘any subsequent practice in the application of the
treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its
and R. Bernhardt, ‘Evolutive Treaty Interpretation, Especially of the European
Convention on Human Rights’, German YbIL, 42 (1999), 11–25.
111 Golder v. United Kingdom, supra n. 62 (paragraph 29). For an overview, see
M. E. Villiger, ‘Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in
the Case-Law of the European Court of Human Rights’ in J. Bröhmer, R. Bieber,
C. Calliess, S. Langenfeld, C. Weber and J. Wolf (eds.), Internationale Gemeinschaft
und Menschenrechte: Festschrift für Georg Ress (Köln: Carl Heymanns Verlag, 2005), pp.
317–330.
112 E.g. OC-16/99, The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of
Guarantees for Due Legal Process, IACtHR Advisory Opinion of 1 Oct. 1999, Series A,
No. 16 (paragraph 58).
113 See K. Mechlem, ‘Treaty Bodies and the Interpretation of Human Rights’, Vanderbilt
JTL, 42 (2009), 905–947, at 919.
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interpretation’must be taken into account. That subsequent practice may
include State practice as well as the practice of supervisory bodies and
may be used to establish original or changing intent.114 Finally, Article
31(3)(c) VCLT provides that ‘any relevant rules of international law
applicable in the relations between the parties’ are relevant for clariﬁca-
tion of the meaning of that treaty.115
Application of the ‘living instrument’ method is rather unproble-
matic in cases where there have been obvious changes in State practice
or relevant rules of international law and it is inevitable to interpret
a given treaty in light of these changes. A good illustration of this is
Matthews v. United Kingdom, which raised the question of whether
elections to the European Parliament fall within the right to vote
guaranteed by Article 3 of Protocol No. 1 to the ECHR. The European
Court of Human Rights held that they did. Invoking the ‘living instru-
ment’ metaphor, it stated that ‘[t]he mere fact that a body was not
envisaged by the drafters of the Convention cannot prevent that body
from falling within the scope of the Convention’ and that it had to take
into account structural changes mutually agreed by the contracting
States.116
At the same time, the relevant human rights bodies have accepted that
the requirements of State consensus and legal certainty impose limits on
the use of the ‘living instrument’ method. As explained previously, the
European Court has explicitly recognised that it may not engage in law-
making by, for example, creating rights not intended by the original
drafters of the ECHR117 or engaging in creative interpretation in areas
that have been singled out by the contracting States for reform by way of
treaty amendment.118 The Human Rights Committee has asserted that
evolutive interpretation needs to be balanced against the need to ‘ensure
both consistency and coherence of . . . jurisprudence’.119 In a similar vein,
the European Court has acknowledged that, despite its ‘living instru-
ment’ approach, ‘in the interests of legal certainty and foreseeability it
should not depart, without good reason, from its own precedents’.120
114 See the contribution to this volume of Buga at pp. 363–391 (Chapter 12).
115 Emphases added.
116 Matthews v. United Kingdom, No. 24833/94, Judgment of 18 Feb. 1999, Reports 1999-I
(paragraph 39).
117 Johnston v. Ireland, supra n. 68 (paragraph 53) andAustin and Others v. United Kingdom,
supra n. 74 (paragraph 53).
118 Soering v. United Kingdom, supra n. 72 (paragraph 103).
119 Judge v. Canada, supra n. 93 (paragraph 10.3).
120 Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, supra n. 56 (paragraph 121).
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Despite these assertions, the previous review of case law of relevant
supervisory bodies reveals that it is, at the very least, questionable
whether they can be said to have always complied with these restrictions.
First, although there are frequent references to the alleged practice of
States (be it the respondent State, other States parties or even non-States
parties), only very rarely is evidence for that practice or its uniformity
adduced. As explained previously, this already held true for Tyrer, where
the ‘living instrument’ concept was established, and it equally applies to
many of the subsequent cases. Second, in some of the cases the respective
human rights body did, in fact, not even claim that the State practice
concerned was uniform, despite the fact that Article 31(3)(b) VCLT
requires the State practice to reﬂect agreement regarding a particular
interpretation. The practice must be actively shared by at least some
States parties and acquiesced in by the others.121 Nevertheless, in
Christine Goodwin, for example, the European Court explicitly recog-
nised that there was no common European approach supporting its
interpretation; it thought that it was suﬃcient that there was evidence
of a ‘continuing international trend’ in non-European States. InMarckx,
it satisﬁed itself with signs of an ‘evolution of rules and attitudes’
‘amongst modern societies’. The Human Rights Committee, in Judge,
referred to a ‘broadening international consensus’ to justify a deviation
from its previous jurisprudence and, in Yoon and Choi, to an ‘increasing
number’ of States parties to read a right to conscientious objection into
Article 18 ICCPR. Third, with regard to interpretation in the light of
‘relevant rules of international law’, the International Court of Justice
allows, in certain cases, the consideration of rules that came into force
after the conclusion of the treaty at issue.122 However, Article 31(3)(c)
VCLT states that the rules must be ‘applicable in the relations between
the parties’, which also suggests that non-binding rules cannot be relied
upon.123 Nevertheless, the European Court has taken into account not
only, as in Demir and Baykara, treaties that had not been ratiﬁed by the
respondent State and, as inMarckx, treaties that had only been ratiﬁed by
a very small number of States parties to the ECHR but also, as in Rantsev,
121 M. E. Villiger, Commentary on the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
(Leiden: Martinus Nijhoﬀ, 2009), p. 431.
122 Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia
(South West Africa), supra n. 28, at p. 31, and Case Concerning Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros
Project, supra n. 12, at pp. 67–68.
123 Villiger, supra n. 121, at p. 433, and R. K. Gardiner, Treaty Interpretation (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2nd ed., 2015), pp. 299–302.
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even treaties that were not in force at the time the relevant facts occurred.
Moreover, the Court regularly takes into consideration international
materials that are not legally binding.124
This is not to argue that non-uniform State practice or non-binding
rules may not be taken into consideration (they may still serve as sup-
plementary means of interpretation according to Article 32 VCLT) but
merely to point out that the weight given to these means of interpretation
is rather extraordinary when it comes to human rights treaties. Such
a special interpretive approach may be justiﬁed on the basis that human
rights treaties have a special nature, calling for specialised rules of treaty
interpretation, perhaps even ‘interpretive rules that are beyond the VCLT
paradigm’.125 That human rights treaties fundamentally diﬀer from other
treaties, in that they create obligations of States towards individuals
rather than between States, is beyond dispute today.126 The Inter-
American Court, for example, has explained:
Since its ﬁrst cases, the Court has based its jurisprudence on the special
nature of the American Convention in the framework of International
Human Rights Law. Said Convention, like other human rights treaties, is
inspired by higher shared values (focusing on protection of the human
being), they have speciﬁc oversight mechanisms, they are applied accord-
ing to the concept of collective guarantees, they embody obligations that
are essentially objective, and their nature is special vis-à-vis other treaties
that regulate reciprocal interests among the States Parties.127
It may be added to the preceding list that, unlike most other types of
treaties, human rights treaties are typically formulated in very general
wording,128 that they give eﬀect to important moral principles129 and that
they, especially regional instruments, are in many respects similar to
constitutions.130
124 E.g. Russian Conservative Party of Entrepreneurs and Others v. Russia, Nos. 55066/00 and
55638/00, Judgment of 11 Jan. 2007 (referring to a resolution of the Parliamentary
Assembly and a code of good practice adopted by the Venice Commission) and Bekos
and Koutropoulos v. Greece, No. 15250/02, Judgment of 13 Dec. 2005 (referring to
a report of the European Commission Against Racism).
125 B. Çali, ‘Specialized Rules of Treaty Interpretation: Human Rights’ in D. B. Hollis (ed.),
The Oxford Guide to Treaties (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), pp. 525–548.
126 See e.g. M. Craven, ‘Legal Diﬀerentiation and the Concept of theHuman Rights Treaty in
International Law’, EJIL, 11 (2000), 489–519.
127 ‘Mapiripán Massacre’ v. Colombia, supra n. 85 (paragraph 104).
128 See Çali, supra n. 125, at p. 530. 129 See Letsas, supra n. 75, at p. 79.
130 See Loizidou v. Turkey (Preliminary Objections), supra n. 57 (paragraph 75) (describing
the ECHR as ‘a constitutional instrument of European public order’).
158 daniel moeckli and nigel d. white
Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316179031.008
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zürich, on 07 Dec 2018 at 20:13:02, subject to the
Given the special object and purpose – and, as a consequence, char-
acter – of human rights treaties, it is indeed inevitable that their inter-
pretation diﬀers from that of other treaties, especially in that State
consent can only play a limited role. Most importantly, whether the
respondent State agrees with a given interpretation of a human rights
treaty cannot be a decisive factor. Therefore, it is correct to conclude that
it does not matter whether an evolutive interpretation is supported by the
subsequent practice of the respondent State or its ratiﬁcation of other
treaties. The more diﬃcult question is to what extent the ‘present-day
conditions’ or standards that give rise to a particular interpretation must
be shared among the States parties. The supervisory bodies have been
very lenient in this regard, sometimes explicitly rejecting the notion that
theremust be a common approach supporting a change in interpretation.
A good illustration – and at the same time justiﬁcation – of this inter-
pretive approach may be found in a separate opinion of Judge Garlicki of
the European Court of Human Rights. Pointing out that the ECHR
‘represents a very distinct form of international instrument’ whose ‘sub-
stance and process of application are more akin to those of national
constitutions than to those of “typical” international treaties’, he invoked
the Court’s ‘living instrument’ approach and observed that ‘[t]his may
result (and, in fact, has on numerous occasions resulted) in judicial
modiﬁcations of the original meaning of the Convention’. He went on
to state:
From this perspective, the role of our Court is not very diﬀerent from the
role of national Constitutional Courts, whose mandate is not only to
defend constitutional provisions on human rights, but also to develop
them . . . Thus, it is legitimate to assume that, as long as the member States
have not clearly rejected a particular judicial interpretation of the
Convention . . . the Court has the power to determine the actual meaning
of words and phrases which were inserted into the text of the Convention
more than ﬁfty years ago.131
However, what Judge Garlicki failed to mention is that there are also
important diﬀerences between constitutions and the ECHR, not the least
of which concerns the legitimacy of an evolutive or dynamic approach to
interpretation. In the case of a constitution, an evolutive interpretation by
the constitutional court can be limited or corrected through the demo-
cratic process of amending the constitution. In the case of the ECHR as
131 Öcalan v. Turkey [GC], No. 46221/99, Judgment of 12 May 2005, ECHR 2005-IV, partly
concurring, partly dissenting opinion of Judge Garlicki (paragraph 4).
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a multilateral treaty, in contrast, a State that objects to a particular
interpretation may only withdraw from the Convention, which is nor-
mally a politically unrealistic option. An evolutive interpretation of
a human rights treaty may thus not draw its legitimacy from the avail-
ability of a democratic corrective; it can only draw it from the consent of
as many States parties as possible.
The supervisory bodies must be – and clearly are – aware that they
must balance dynamic interpretation against the need for State sup-
port and expectations regarding legal certainty. Seen from this per-
spective, it becomes clear that invocations of the ‘living instrument’
notion are frequently intended precisely to garner State support for
a particular interpretation. In Tyrer, for instance, there was no other
reason for the Court to characterise the ECHR as a ‘living instru-
ment’: its ﬁnding clearly suggests that all corporal punishment is
inherently degrading, regardless of how many States have abolished
it or what the public opinion on the matter is. The only reason for the
Court to highlight developments in the member States, which, after
all, needed to be taken into account when interpreting the
Convention as a ‘living instrument’, was to generate support for its
interpretation of Article 3. The same can be observed with regard to
many of the other cases discussed previously: the ‘living instrument’
notion is not instrumental to the respective supervisory body’s hold-
ing, but added as a kind of side-note to show that a particular under-
standing of the treaty is, in any event, reﬂected in State practice or
international legal instruments or that there are, at least, signs of
a trend towards such an understanding.
While such use of the ‘living instrument’method is understandable, it
often confuses things more than contribute to anything. Where, as in
Tyrer, there are compelling reasons for a given interpretation, there is no
need to invoke the ‘living instrument’ character of a treaty: if it is true that
human rights give eﬀect to ‘higher shared values’, it cannot matter
whether States think a given treatment is degrading or not. When it is
invoked, the respective supervisory bodies should, at the very least, take
care to explain why and in how far exactly subsequent State practice or
developments in international law matter and, of course, back up the
alleged practice with evidence. It is not suﬃcient for them to merely cite
the European Court’s judgment in Tyrer: as explained previously, that
judgment lacks any explanation of the ‘living instrument’ method of
interpretation.
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4 Arms Control Treaties
In the case of human rights treaties, the concept of ‘living instrument’ is
used to explain (quasi-)judicial development of the relevant treaty, devel-
opment which may well be ahead of State consensus. In the case of the
UN Charter, interpretive development is in the hands of political organs
and therefore puts the State back at centre stage, except that organs
operate by way of majorities. The understandings of those majorities,
for example as to what are the current threats to international peace, give
the UN Charter life. The question remains as to whether treaties that do
not have institutions (either judicial or political) at their heart can still be
viewed as ‘living instruments’. With regard to these treaties, the meta-
phor might not be invoked, but if they exhibit signs of life that allow them
to develop to reﬂect wider changes then they are, to all intents and
purposes, also ‘living instruments’.
The argument in this section is that the concept of ‘living instrument’
is a metaphor that can be applied to a range of diﬀerent types of treaties,
so that it is untrue to say that this form of interpretive technique and
understanding is conﬁned to, say, human rights treaties or the UN
Charter. Variation in interpretive techniques, and hence the amount of
vitality within a treaty, is explicable on the basis of the diﬀerent nature of
the treaty being considered, whether they are contractual, law-making or
constitutional. In general terms, this section illustrates the contention
that, although the language of ‘living instruments’ is not used in relation
to arms control treaties, the ideas and interpretive techniques involved
are present in some of these treaties, although not in others.
In the modern era, treaty law purports to cover a range of diﬀerent
types of conventions. At the one end of the spectrum, there is the
bilateral, contractual treaty. In the area of arms control, this is embodied
by the now defunct Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty132 and the
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaties (START)133 between the USA and the
USSR/Russia.134 In these treaties, there is greater certainty in the text as
the terms were hammered out on a take-it-or-leave-it basis by the two
parties. The rights and duties are relatively clear, and therefore, the text
dominates the life of the treaty unless both parties agree on changes or, as
132 944 UNTS 13. 133 2264 UNTS 63.
134 The analysis in this section draws on N. D. White, ‘Interpretation of Non-Proliferation
Treaties’ in D. H. Joyner and M. Roscini (eds.), Non-Proliferation Law as a Special
Regime: A Contribution to Fragmentation Theory in International Law (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 87–118.
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with the 1972 ABMTreaty between the USA and USSR/Russia, one party
withdraws. This is not to state that the ABMTreaty was not an important
treaty – it was the ‘cornerstone of strategic stability’ during the Cold
War135 – but it reﬂected the bilateral and bipolar nature of the ColdWar.
At the other end of the spectrum, there is a multiparty constitutional
treaty that is both conventional and institutional,136 laying down rules
but also creating institutions and organs, paradigmatically the UN
Charter discussed previously. However, as has been established when
looking at human rights treaties, the metaphor of a ‘living instrument’ is
not conﬁned to those constitutional-type treaties but is also used with
regard to certain law-making treaties that have an inbuilt dynamic, such
as an expert committee or court, which can interpret the treaty in the
light of changes in social conditions.
The question is whether there is any room for the idea of ‘living
instrument’ in an area of law that is heavily State-dominated where
clarity and certainty are important for the States parties. In these condi-
tions, we might expect to ﬁnd the opposite of ‘living instruments’ –
lifeless, more accurately timeless, treaties under which States can operate
in conﬁdence, knowing that the obligations within them are not subject
to change. However, as shall be seen, even arms control treaties can be –
indeed, have to be – ‘living instruments’; otherwise technological change
would outstrip their normative reach. For instance, a prohibition on
chemical weapons only works if we constantly re-evaluate our under-
standing of what chemical weapons are.
Unfortunately, arms control law is not populated with courts sitting in
judgment, and thereby simultaneously applying and developing the rules
contained in the three non-proliferation treaties to be considered in this
section – the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT),137 the 1972
Biological Weapons Convention (BWC)138 and the 1993 Chemical
Weapons Convention (CWC).139 They are all multilateral treaties,
though the CWC is institutional as well as conventional, establishing
the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW).
135 J. B. Rhinelander, ‘The ABMTreaty – Past, Present and Future (Part I)’, J. Conﬂict & Sec.
L., 6 (2001), 91–114, at 92.
136 The International Court of Justice has stated that the ‘constituent instruments of inter-
national organizations are also treaties of a particular type . . . Such treaties can raise
speciﬁc problems of interpretation owing, inter alia, to their character which is conven-
tional and at the same time institutional’: Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear
Weapons in Armed Conﬂict (Advisory Opinion) (1996) ICJ Rep. 66, at p. 75.
137 729 UNTS 161. 138 1015 UNTS 163. 139 1974 UNTS 45.
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This does not necessarily mean that only the CWC is a ‘living instru-
ment’; we have to go deeper to try to understand the nature of these
treaties. In general terms, the overall purpose of these treaties is to
address the ‘horizontal proliferation ofWMD’ (weapons of mass destruc-
tion) with provisions ‘proscribing possession, development, and transfer
of both single-use WMD-related materials (i.e. those items and technol-
ogies primarily suited for use inWMD development programs) as well as
dual-useWMD-related materials (i.e. items and technologies which have
both civilian and military applications)’.140 As well as aiming to prevent
the proliferation of WMDs among a wider group of States, the treaties
also aim to prevent the proliferation of weapons within States already
possessing them (‘vertical proliferation’).141
In the seminal article written at the time of the NPT, MasonWillrich is
clear about the signiﬁcance of the treaty for achieving the ‘goal of over-
riding importance in the nuclear era . . . the avoidance of nuclear war’.142
The NPT was agreed in the Cold War period, when both superpowers
desired to draw back from mutually assured destruction, and not only
constituted a bargain between the superpowers on the possession and
development of both nuclear weapons and nuclear power but was also
law-making for the rest of the international community.
It is common to describe the NPT of 1968 as a ‘grand bargain’ between
nuclear weapon States (NWS) and non-nuclear weapon States (NNWS).
This suggests some sort of exchange between these two diﬀerent group-
ings of States, thereby creating a static set of obligations and rights.
Essentially, NWS were obliged not to provide WMD to NNWS and not
to proliferate their own; indeed the obligation is to ‘eventually disarm
themselves of nuclear weapons’.143 NNWS, on their side, agreed not to
acquire nuclear weapons or to develop them themselves. ‘In exchange for
their commitment to forgo what would otherwise be their right, equal to
that’ of NWS, NNWS insisted not only on the recognition of their right to
acquire ‘nuclear technologies for the purpose of civilian power genera-
tion’ but also on an obligation of NWS to help in the development of their
civilian nuclear programmes.144 In crude terms, the deal was for NWS to
retain their right to nuclear weapons while NNWS gave up any right to
140 D. H. Joyner, International Law and the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. xv.
141 Ibid.
142 M. Willrich, ‘The Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons: Nuclear
Technology Confronts World Politics’, Yale Law J., 77 (1968), 1447–1519, at 1449.
143 Joyner, supra n. 140, at p. 8. 144 Ibid., at p. 9.
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have them. In exchange for this deviation from sovereign equality, NWS
promised to gradually disarm and to help develop peaceful uses of
nuclear technology in NNWS. This bargain, according to Daniel
Joyner, distinguishes the NPT as a contractual treaty from ‘most other
large multilateral treaties’, for example, the Genocide Convention145 and
the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,146 which are
law-making treaties where ‘there is no consideration given between the
States in exchange for the undertaking of obligations’.147
This suggests that the NPT is paradigmatically contractual, creating
a certain (and static) set of rights and duties for both NWS and NNWS,
a conception which does not seem to leave much room for the notion of
‘living instrument’. While making an understandable argument, Joyner
may be failing to distinguish between diﬀerent forms of contract, in
particular ‘social contracts’, which are much more profound than
a contractual transaction whereby one party agrees to give up weapons
if the other party does (as in the START). A social contract at the
international level is found in the UN Charter, whereby the ﬁve Great
Powers agreed to act as the world’s police force in exchange for voting
rights that no other member would possess. It is no coincidence that
those ﬁve permanent members are the NWS at the heart of the NPT
‘grand bargain’, thus suggesting that the NPT is something more pro-
found than an ordinary traité-contrat; indeed, it may be more constitu-
tional than a traité-loi since it develops the ‘grand bargain’ found in the
UN Charter by extending the inequality between the P5 and other
members of the UN to the possession of nuclear weapons.148 This
suggests that although the NPT may be less dynamic than treaties that
include within them modes for change (political, judicial or quasi-
judicial organs), such foundational treaties will be adaptable to changing
conditions if they are to keep their relevance; the question is how.
Of the ﬁve nuclear weapons States at the time of the NPT, three were
original parties in 1968 (USA, USSR, UK), while two only became parties
in 1992 (China and France). Further, though the treaty was originally
adopted for twenty-ﬁve years, it was renewed indeﬁnitely by consensus at
the Review Conference in New York in 1995. This indicates that, despite
the presence of a right of withdrawal (in Article X), in one sense the
‘grand bargain’ has become even stronger over the decades, though the
145 Supra n. 33. 146 1833 UNTS 3. 147 Ibid.
148 See, further, T. M. Franck, The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1990), pp. 176–177.
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spread of nuclear weapons to States outside the ﬁve indicates the strain it
is under.149 The essence of the NPT is that a handful of States have the
right to nuclear weapons while others do not; but despite that inequality,
the ‘grand bargain’, taken as a whole, is a constitutional treaty, and not
only in an ‘originalist’ sense but in a ‘living’ sense. The NPT, like the
CWC, has an institutional element (in the form of the IAEA) which
assists in the development of the treaty by interpreting and applying it
(especially Article III). As Richard Williamson states, the potential ‘dual-
use’ capability of both nuclear materials and chemicals requires a ‘high
degree of intrusiveness’ by the OPCW and the IAEA.150 This dynamic
interpretive element keeps the treaty alive, but this is perhaps not as
important as the ﬂuctuations in the ‘grand bargain’ underlying the NPT.
Thus, it is contended that the NPT forms part of the ‘grand bargain’ or
social contract at the heart of the international legal and political order,
alongside the UN Charter, and should be interpreted as a constitutional
text, not a contractual one;151 thereby placing equal emphasis on the
purposes of the treaty, the practice of parties and the words of the
provisions themselves. This is not the orthodox position, which portrays
the ‘grand bargain’ in the NPT being a relatively straightforward
exchange between two groups of States, which has remained static since
1968.152 Under an ‘originalist’ interpretation of the NPT, all the elements
of the bargain remain in place and in full force – that is, the obligations on
NWS not to proliferate to NNWS (in Article I) and to negotiate nuclear
disarmament (in Article VI) and in return the obligations on NNWS not
to acquire nuclear weapons (in Article II), to develop peaceful uses of
nuclear energy in accordance with Articles I and II (in Article IV) and to
submit to safeguards agreements negotiated with the IAEA to prevent
peaceful uses of nuclear energy being diverted to nuclear weapons pro-
grammes (in Article III).
Joyner argues that this balance cannot be disturbed by subsequent
interpretation and development. In fact, he argues that subsequent state-
ments (after 1998, more vociferously after 11 September 2001) by some
149 E. Louka, Nuclear Weapons, Justice and the Law (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2011), pp.
98–122.
150 R. L. Williamson, Jr., ‘Hard Law, Soft Law, and Non-Law in Multilateral Arms Control:
Some Compliance Hypotheses’, Chicago JIL, 4 (2003), 59–82, at 72.
151 But see M. J. Glennon, The Fog of Law: Pragmatism, Security and International Law
(Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010), pp. 136–139, which argues strongly
against ‘entrenchment’ of the NPT and instead argues for a more coercive counter-
proliferation regime.
152 Joyner, supra n. 140, at pp. 10–11.
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NWS (especially the USA) emphasising non-proliferation obligations,
and downplaying or eroding their disarmament obligations,153 are
incompatible with the NPT.154 However, while it may be argued that in
1968 all the elements of the ‘grand bargain’ carried equal weight, as that
was what was necessary to achieve the bargain, it is muchmore diﬃcult to
sustain that original understanding if that bargain is part of the interna-
tional constitutional order, which should be open to development by the
subsequent agreement and practice of States parties in accordance with
changes in international relations. The avoidance of nuclear war by
limiting the spread of nuclear weapons can be seen as the bottom line
for the NPT, and this in itself would permit the prioritisation of non-
proliferation over disarmament. However, the interpretation of constitu-
tional treaties is driven not simply by a pragmatic understanding of the
changing nature of international relations but by the changing under-
standing of States parties. Subsequent practice as a means of interpreta-
tion means that changes in emphasis within a constitutional regime must
be supported by States parties. There is little indication from the ﬁve-
yearly NPT Review Conferences that NNWS agree with NWS
interpretations;155 hence overall practice does not point to a changed
understanding of the NPT. In fact, as Joyner points out, a purposive
analysis of the NPT supports the original ‘grand bargain’ under which
equal weight was to be given to all the elements,156 including non-
proliferation and disarmament. Thus, a constitutional approach to inter-
pretation, which has regard to subsequent practice of the parties as well as
the purposes of the treaty rather than just the text, produces a stronger
reaﬃrmation of the ‘grand bargain’ than a textual approach.
Indeed, under a textual approach it is possible to read the non-
proliferation provisions of Articles I and II NPT as embodying much
ﬁrmer obligations on States parties (each NWS and NNWS ‘undertakes
not to . . .’) than the disarmament obligation in Article VI (in which States
parties ‘undertake to pursue negotiations in good faith on eﬀective mea-
sures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and
to nuclear disarmament’). The latter provision has been interpreted very
narrowly indeed by one US representative on nuclear non-proliferation to
mean that it contains no legal requirement to conclude negotiations,157
153 Ibid., at pp. 37–45. 154 Ibid., at p. 108. 155 Ibid., at pp. 45–46.
156 Ibid., at pp. 31–32 and 34.
157 C. A. Ford, ‘Debating Disarmament: Interpreting Article VI of the Treaty on
Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons’, Nonproliferation Rev., 14 (2007), 401–428,
at 408.
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disagreeing with the International Court of Justice in its advisory opinion
of July 1996, which stated that ‘there exists an obligation to pursue in good
faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarma-
ment in all its aspects under strict and eﬀective international control’.158
Thus, applying a constitutional approach to interpretation opens the
NPT up to subsequent (re)interpretation by the parties. In fact, the
consistent statements by NNWS (which are the vast majority of States
parties to the NPT) that the diﬀerent elements of the ‘grand bargain’ have
equal weight in the treaty159 are the key element in maintaining that
interpretation. Focus has been on the States parties coming together in
review conferences, diﬀerentiating the NPT from other constitutional
treaties, such as the UN Charter where subsequent interpretation is
undertaken by the political organs of the United Nations: the General
Assembly, where all members are present; and the Security Council,
where only ﬁfteen members are present, including the P5. A diﬃcult
question in relation to the NPT is whether a constitutional approach to
interpretation opens up the NPT for (re)interpretation by institutions
which have responsibilities towards it. The IAEA can undoubtedly have
an inﬂuence on the development of peaceful uses of nuclear power by
NNWS through the development of safeguards agreements with NNWS
under Article III NPT.160 But can the Security Council have an inﬂuence
on the non-proliferation elements in the exercise of its security func-
tions? To admit this could be seen as allowing the NWS under the NPT
(via their position as the P5 in the Security Council) to have an undue
inﬂuence on the understanding of the obligations under the NPT.
Security Council Resolution 1887 on nuclear non-proliferation and
nuclear disarmament, adopted unanimously in September 2009, shows,
as the title suggests, an emphasis on both non-proliferation and disarma-
ment. The only equivocation in this regard is that while the resolution
potentially regards violation of the non-proliferation provisions as
a threat to international peace and security (and subject to Security
Council competence and presumably measures), the obligation to disarm
on NWS is not such a matter, though the resolution does call upon States
to negotiate in good faith under Article VI NPT. But this simply reﬂects
158 Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons (Advisory Opinion) (1996) ICJ Rep.
226, at pp. 263–264 (paragraph 99).
159 D. H. Joyner, Interpreting the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2011), p. 73.
160 Ibid., at pp. 92–93 (on IAEA’s role under Art. III NPT). See, further, L. Rockwood,
‘The IAEA’s Strengthened Safeguard System’, J. Conﬂict & Sec. L., 7 (2002), 123–136.
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the very nature of the inequality at the heart of the post-1945 interna-
tional legal order, whereby the Great Powers (as NWS and as P5 mem-
bers) are not subject to Security Council censure or measures.
The resolution calls upon ‘all States Parties to the NPT to cooperate so
that the 2010 NPT Review Conference can successfully strengthen the
Treaty and set realistic and achievable goals in all the Treaty’s three
pillars: non-proliferation, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and
disarmament’.161 Thus, the three pillars remain intact even when inter-
preted by the Security Council.
Equal emphasis on the three pillars of the NPT is also found in the ﬁnal
document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference,162 which witnessed
a return to consensus under the inﬂuence of President Obama and in
light of a new START agreement between the USA and Russia. Thus, in
2009–2010, there was strong subsequent practice to support the conti-
nuation of the ‘grand bargain’ of the NPT, understood in a constitutional
sense.
While the NPT can thus be characterised as a constitutional treaty, the
BWC and CWC are ‘merely’ law-making treaties – though we still have to
consider whether the presence of the OPCW makes a diﬀerence to the
latter. The NPT is ‘elevated’ above the other arms control treaties for two
reasons: ﬁrst, the presence of the ‘grand bargain’ and, second, the fact that
nuclear weapons are the most destructive and, paradoxically, are seen as
the most legitimate of theWMD. This legitimacy is enhanced by the NPT
itself,163 which, unlike the other treaties, does not prohibit the WMD in
question but just limits their proliferation. Nuclear weapons are allowed
but only in the hands of the Great Powers, thereby acknowledging their
central role in the international legal order.164
The BWC is a law-making treaty establishing a universal prohibition
on the possession of such weapons, but because of the absence of
institutional machinery, its implementation and its development has
stagnated – it is not a ‘living instrument’.165 This is not untypical of law-
making treaties agreed during the Cold War-era and can be contrasted
with the CWC agreed in 1993, which, as well as containing a clear ban on
chemical weapons, constituted the OPCW. Undoubtedly, it is important
to have a ban on biological weapons, but, in the absence of similar
161 At paragraph 6. 162 Joyner, supra n. 159, at pp. 121–122.
163 Joyner, supra n. 140, at p. 69.
164 See further G. Simpson, Great Powers and Outlaw States (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2004).
165 Joyner, supra n. 140, at p. 123.
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machinery, there is the obvious problem that non-proliferation depends
solely on each State party accepting and implementing its obligations.
Even under the later CWC, where there is oversight machinery, the lack
of usage of the system that allows one State to challenge another166
suggests that States are not always willing to look behind the veil of
pacta sunt servanda.167 However, dynamics are built into the CWC in
other ways, with regular reviews of the operation of the convention by the
conference of the parties, empowered ‘to take into account any relevant
scientiﬁc and technological developments’.168 An Executive Council of
the OPCW ensures the eﬀective implementation of the CWC by, inter
alia, supervising the Technical Secretariat.169 This arm of the OPCW
carries out inspections in States parties’ territories on the basis of agree-
ment between the organization and the State party170 and in so doing is
constantly interpreting the treaty. In addition, the treaty is kept up-to-
date with changes in technology and scientiﬁc developments by any State
party being allowed to propose amendments,171 including to the Annex
on Chemicals (which lists toxic chemicals and precursors).172
Amendments, if accepted by the Executive Council, shall be made to
the Annex if no State party objects. If there are objections, the proposal
shall be considered at the next session of the Conference of the Parties
and a decision shall be taken as a matter of substance,173 which means by
consensus, if possible, and, if not, by two-thirds majority.174 As can be
seen, there is a dynamism built into the CWC, which is largely State-led
but also driven by technical expertise on the ground.
5 Conclusion
The notion of ‘living instrument’ has an intuitive appeal – as William
Rehnquist once observed, only a necrophile would disagree that a living
constitution is better than what must be its counterpart, a dead
constitution.175 The ‘living instrument’ metaphor may not be
a completely accurate description for a legal instrument such as
a treaty: it suggests that the treaty is alive when it is in fact the external
166 Art. IX(9) CWC: supra n. 139. 167 Joyner, supra n. 140, at p. 115.
168 Art. VIIIB(22) CWC: supra n. 139. 169 Art. VIIIC(31) CWC: ibid.
170 Art. VIIID(39) CWC: ibid. 171 Art. XV(1) CWC: ibid.
172 Art. II(2)-(3) CWC: ibid. 173 Art. XV(5) CWC: ibid.
174 Art. VIIIB(18) CWC: ibid.
175 W. H. Rehnquist, ‘The Notion of a Living Constitution’, Texas L. Rev., 54 (1976),
693–706.
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social conditions that are changing. However, those changing conditions
may act to breathe life into treaties through the understandings and
interpretations of organs (political, (quasi-)judicial or technical) and
States parties. Thus, it is true to say that a treaty may have a ‘living’
element: namely, some internal features that allow interpretive actors (be
they States or organs created by the treaty) to legitimately contribute to
a developing understanding of its provisions, often as a result of external
stimuli. Social change triggers change in the treaty through the medium
of interpretive agents.
Thus, a treaty may indeed change in relation to changing social con-
ditions and therefore justiﬁably be described as a ‘living instrument’.
However, this is only possible if the following two elements are present:
ﬁrst, it is a predominantly constitutional or law-making, rather than
contractual, treaty; second, it has an inbuilt dynamic for change in the
form of a court, a quasi-judicial body, a political organ, a technical body
(such as the OPCW or the IAEA) or a regular (and active) conference of
the State parties. It is the understanding of this body as a collective in
relation to changed social conditions (and not the social conditions
per se) that is the determinative factor. Under classical international
law, only a ‘living instrument’ that is driven by the collective under-
standings of all the States parties could be seen as fully respecting the
principle of consent. However, it is reasonable to conclude that, by
agreeing to the establishment of a political organ of limited membership
or one that adopts decisions by majority vote, States have accepted an
erosion of their consent. This holds all the more true for a treaty that
establishes a judicial or quasi-judicial organ, since the States parties have
thereby accepted that the treaty will be developed by (quasi-)judicial
interpretation.
Treaties with courts or quasi-judicial bodies are likely to have more
‘life’ than treaties that rely on a review conference of the State parties.
However, the latter will more accurately reﬂect the views of States as to
changing social conditions, so that any slight change in understanding
will not only be indicative of signs of ‘life’ within a treaty but will reﬂect
a change in State behaviour, something that is not guaranteed by
dynamic judicial interpretation. Dynamic judicial interpretation of
a treaty is an attempt to inﬂuence State behaviour to conform to changing
social conditions. Courts employ the ‘living instrument’ notion as a legal
concept to lend support to an interpretation of the treaty that may deviate
from the original understanding of the State parties. This explains why
human rights treaties are frequently described as ‘living instruments’,
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while arms control treaties are not. However, the analysis in this chapter
shows that, in fact, there are also signs of ‘life’ in, for example, the NPT.
These signs of ‘life’ are indicative of profound understandings by States of
the precarious bargain that prevents mutual nuclear destruction. Even
the apparently infertile soil of arms control treaties allows for limited
‘life’.
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